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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same correctional facility
have on each other’s subsequent criminal behavior. The analysis is based on data on over 8,000 individuals
serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in Florida. These data
provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and adjudications in the
year following release for each individual. To control for the non-random assignment to facilities,
we include facility and facility-by-prior offense fixed effects, thereby estimating peer effects using
only within-facility variation over time. We find strong evidence of peer effects for burglary, petty
larceny, felony and misdemeanor drug offenses, aggravated assault, and felony sex offenses; the influence
of peers primarily affects individuals who already have some experience in a particular crime category.
We also find evidence that the predominant types of peer effects differ in residential versus non-residential
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“Danbury wasn’t a prison.  It was a crime school.  I went in with a bachelor of marijuana and 
came out with a doctorate of cocaine.” George Jung (Johnny Depp) describing his introduction 
to cocaine industry in the motion picture Blow. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Understanding the importance and nature of social interactions in criminal behavior not 
only provides insight into crime as an economic and social phenomenon, it is also important from 
a policy perspective.  Broadly speaking, social interactions are likely to magnify the impact of 
any changes to economic and social fundamentals, which implies that policy changes are likely to 
have important dynamic benefits and costs. A better understanding of how criminal knowledge is 
spread  and  how  criminal  networks  form  can  also  be  used  to  shape  decisions  throughout  the 
criminal justice system, such as how to optimally group individuals convicted of various crimes 
within correctional facilities so as to reduce future recidivism.  
Prior empirical research has documented  evidence consistent with the possibility that 
social interactions are of first-order importance in criminal behavior. Glaeser et al. (1996), for 
example, show that crime exhibits extremely high variance across time and space and that only a 
small portion of this can be explained by detailed measures of fundamental economic and social 
conditions.
1  A  longstanding  criminology  literature,  starting  with  Glueck  and  Glueck  (1950), 
documents  a  strong  positive  correlation  between  individual  and  peer  criminal  (delinquent) 
behavior.
2 But, few papers convincingly document causal effects of peers on one another. Jacob 
and Lefgren (2003) find that school attendance increases violent crimes but decreases property 
crimes, which underscores the role played by social interactions in explaining violent crimes. 
Other research has studied the role of neighborhoods in determining criminal behavior, although 
it remains unclear in these studies whether the results are driven by changes in private incentives 
or by social interactions (Case and Katz, 1991; Ludwig et. al., 2001; Kling et. al., 2005). 
In light of the limited direct evidence to date, the central goal of this paper is to estimate 
the effects of peer characteristics on criminal behavior in a manner that deals directly with the 
non-random  matching  of  individuals  to  their  peers.  Specifically,  we  examine  whether  the 
behavior of a juvenile offender upon release from a correctional facility is influenced by the 
characteristics of individuals with whom he concurrently served time in that facility. The analysis 
is based on data on over 8,000 individuals who served time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities 
                                                 
1 Glaeser et al. (1996) builds on earlier work on social interactions and crime by Sah (1991) and Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993). 
2 See Akers et. al., 1979; Elliott et. al., 1985; Erickson and Empey, 1965; Jensen, 1972; Matsueda and 
Heimer, 1987; Tittle et. al. 1986; Voss; 1964; Warr and Stafford; 1991). Reiss (1988) and Warr (1996) 
provide a summary of sociological research based on co-offender surveys.   3 
during a two-year period in Florida. These data provide a complete record of past crimes, facility 
assignments, and arrests and adjudications in the year following release for each individual.  
Our empirical analysis consists of a series of regressions that relate recidivism in each of 
a number of crime categories to individual demographic and criminal history characteristics, peer 
demographic and criminal history characteristics, and interactions between these individual and 
peer  characteristics.  To  control  for  the  non-random  assignment  of  juveniles  to  facilities,  we 
include facility and facility-by-prior offense fixed effects in these regressions. This ensures that 
the impact of peers on recidivism is identified using only the variation in the length of time that 
any two individuals who are committed to the same facility happen to overlap.  
Relative to other settings where the estimation of social interactions has proven more 
difficult, this empirical strategy exploits a unique feature of correctional facilities—namely, that 
the peer group is constantly evolving over time with the admittance and release of individuals as 
their sentences begin and expire.
3 As long as the date at which a given individual is assigned to a 
facility within the two-year sample period is random with respect to the peers in the facility at 
that time, this empirical strategy properly controls for the non-random assignment of individuals 
to facilities. We provide a number of tests of this central identifying assumption, demonstrating 
that:  (i)  the  within-facility  variation  in  peer  characteristics  is  orthogonal  to  all  observable 
individual  characteristics,  (ii)  the  estimated  peer  effects  are  completely  robust  to  general  or 
localized trends in criminal activity, and (iii) the estimated peer effects cannot be explained by the 
facility assignment of individuals who have committed crimes together.  
    One of the goals of this paper is to understand how crime is spread and the mechanisms 
underlying this dispersion.  Thus, an important feature of our analysis is that it allows crime-
specific peer effects to vary with an individual’s own criminal experience. In this way, we seek to 
distinguish between peer effects that reinforce existing criminal tendencies and those that cause 
individuals  to  branch  out  into  new  areas  of  criminal  activity.  Our  analysis  provides  strong 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  peer  effects  in  juvenile  correctional  facilities.  In  almost  every 
instance,  these  peer  effects  are  reinforcing  in  nature:  exposure  to  peers  with  a  history  of 
committing  a  particular  crime  increases  the  probability  that  an  individual  who  has  already 
committed  the  same  type  of  crime  recidivates  with  that  crime.  In  our  main  specification, 
reinforcing peer effects exist for burglary, petty larceny, felony and misdemeanor drug offenses, 
                                                 
3 Recent research on peer and neighborhood effects in other settings has relied on particular randomizing 
events, such as the random assignment of roommates (Sacerdote, 2001) or social experiments such as MTO 
in Boston (Katz et. al., 2001) or STAR in Tennessee schools (Boozer and Cacciola, 2001). While  the 
explicit randomization present in these events or experiments is ideal, relying exclusively on such events 
severely limits the settings where peer effects can be studied and the generalizability of the findings.     4 
aggravated assault, and felony sex offenses. In contrast, there is no evidence of such peer effects 
for  individuals  with  no  prior  experience  in  a  given  crime  category.    We  demonstrate  the 
robustness of these results to a variety of alternative specifications and explore heterogeneity in 
the magnitude and nature of peer effects across individuals, peers, and facilities.  Taken as a 
whole, these results help to distinguish among alternative explanations for the existence of crime-
specific peer effects, a matter we take up later in the paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and 
provides some background on the Florida juvenile justice system. Section III outlines our basic 
empirical methodology and presents a number of diagnostic tests of our identifying assumption. 
Section IV presents the results and Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Data and Juvenile Corrections in Florida 
Assignment to Juvenile Corrections in Florida 
The assignment of juveniles to facilities in Florida typically occurs in two steps with the 
judge first deciding the appropriate risk level of the youth and the Department of Juvenile Justice 
then assigning the youth to a particular program.  More specifically, upon the finding by the 
courts that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act, Department of Juvenile Justice probation 
officers  must  prepare  a  predisposition  report  and  assessment.  Under  Florida  statutes,  this 
predisposition report must include a classification of the risk level of the youth, which captures 
the degree to which the youths represent a risk to themselves and the public. There are five risk 
levels: minimum-, low-, moderate-, high-, and maximum-risk. During the period of our study, 
decisions  were  primarily  made  on  the  basis  of  current  and  past  offense  characteristics.
4  In 
addition, individuals whose current offense is a first-degree felony, a sex offense, or a firearm-
related offense are automatically excluded from the minimum and low risk categories. Based on 
the probation officer’s recommendation and assessment of the youth, the judge makes the final 
decision about the appropriate risk level.
5  
                                                 
4 More recently, the probation officer’s report is largely based on the results of an assessment tool that was 
put  in  place  in  2005;  in  addition  to  information  about  current  and  past  offenses,  PACT  (Positive 
Achievement  Change  Tool)  includes  a  series  of  questions  about  schooling,  free  time,  employment, 
relationships, family history, living arrangements, alcohol and drugs, mental health problems, attitudes, 
aggression and skills. The recommended risk level is largely based on the youth’s PACT score. 
5 Significant  efforts were made  to  identify an algorithm that  is used  to assign  the risk  level. Such an 
algorithm is not written into Florida statutes nor readily available.   5 
These  risk  levels  are  also  used  to  classify  facilities.
6  One  of  the  primary  differences 
across facilities within these different risk levels is the level of access that youths have to the 
community. Minimum risk facilities are non-residential; youths in these facilities live at home 
and participate at least five days a week in a day treatment program.  Low risk facilities are 
residential  but  the  youth  are  allowed  to  have  unsupervised  access  to  the  community.  Only 
supervised access to the community is allowed in moderate risk facilities and rare access in high 
and maximum risk facilities. The level of security also increases with facility level.  
Given this judge-assigned risk level, the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice places 
the juvenile in a particular program.  These programs vary greatly in type: there  are halfway 
houses,  group  treatment  homes,  boot  camps,  contracted  day  treatment  programs,  intensive 
residential treatment programs, sex offender programs, work and wilderness programs, jails, etc.
7 
The decision as to the appropriate program within a given risk level for a particular youth is based 
on a number of factors, including: the recommendation of the probation officer, any special needs 
of the youth that were determined in the assessment, and the availability of beds. 
 
Data Description 
The primary data source is the internal database maintained by the Florida Department of 
Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for juvenile offenders under its care. We were granted access to the DJJ’s 
records on all youths (16,164 individuals) released from a Florida-based juvenile correctional 
facility between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1999.
8 For each of these individuals, the data detail 
whether or not the individual recidivates within the first year following release. Because the type 
of crime committed upon recidivating is only available if the individual is younger than age 
eighteen at the date of re-arrest (i.e. still a juvenile in the Florida system), we restrict the sample 
to individuals age seventeen and younger at the time of release.
9 Of the 9,382 individuals younger 
than seventeen at release, the data are missing facility assignment in 982 cases and admit/release 
date  information  in  an  additional  184  cases.  Thus,  the  primary  sample  used  in  our  analysis 
contains 8,216 juveniles aged seventeen and younger at the time of release. It is important to 
                                                 
6 See the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice website, http://www.djj.state.fl.us/Residential/index.html, 
for more details. 
7 A detailed description of the different types of facilities can be found in Bayer and Pozen (2005). 
8  Note  that  this  sample  structure  does  not  limit  our  ability  to  observe  sentences  of  any  length.  The 
individuals that we observe serving longer sentences simply tend to have been admitted earlier, sometimes 
well before our study period begins.  
9 Individuals who are 14 and older and who commit sufficiently serious crimes may be processed in the 
adult criminal system. Though we cannot observe such recidivism offenses, this should not influence the 
results regarding relatively minor crimes such as misdemeanor drugs, petty larceny, and burglary.   6 
emphasize, however, that all individuals for whom facility assignment and admit/release date 
information is available are used in constructing the measures of peer characteristics.  
The sample includes not only detailed information on recidivism behavior, but also data 
on the youths’ correctional facility assignments, criminal histories, personal characteristics, and 
home  neighborhoods.  Descriptive  statistics  are  presented  in  Table  1.  Measures  of  overall 
recidivism can be constructed on the basis of either a subsequent adjudication (conviction) or a 
subsequent criminal charge. 51 percent of the sample recidivates within a year of release by the 
former  measure  and  67  percent  by  the  latter.  We  use  a  subsequent  criminal  charge  as  our 
definition of recidivism because this characterization permits individuals to recidivate in multiple 
crime  categories  (many  do)  and  avoids  a  series  of  issues  related  to  adjudication  when  an 
individual has been charged in multiple categories.
10 Using this measure of recidivism, Table 1 
shows that 14 percent of the sample recidivates with a burglary offense, 12 percent with a petty 
larceny offense, and 9 percent with a felony drug offense, misdemeanor drug offense, auto theft, 
and  a  grand  larceny  offense,  respectively.  Note  that  because  the  different  possible  outcome 
variables  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  the  sum  of  the  recidivism  rates  in  all  possible  crime 
categories is greater than the overall recidivism rate of 67 percent. 
The paper focuses on ten main crime categories: auto theft, burglary, grand larceny, petty 
larceny,  robbery,  felony  drug  crimes,  misdemeanor  drug  crimes,  aggravated  assault  and/or 
battery, felony weapons crimes, and felony sex crimes. Appendix Table 1 contains descriptions of 
particular crimes associated with each of these categories. These categories were chosen on the 
basis of three criteria: (i) the offense is serious enough to contribute to the FBI crime index; (ii) 
the offense is defined well enough to interpret the results; and (iii) recidivism rates are great 
enough  so  that  the  estimation  is  reasonably  precise.  Disorderly  conduct  is  not  included,  for 
example, because the exact nature of the offense varies greatly across crimes, and misdemeanor 
sex offense is not included because only 27 of the 8,216 individuals recidivate with this crime.  
The individual characteristics listed in Table 1 provide basic information on the youths’ 
age,  gender,  race,  and  sentence  length.  The  criminal  history variables  encompass  all  charges 
formally brought against the youth within the Florida system prior to placement in a correctional 
facility;  the  variables  used  in  our  analysis  indicate  whether  an  individual  has  any  history  of 
committing a particular type of offense, regardless of the number of times the individual has 
committed the offense. Neighborhood characteristic variables are constructed using each youth’s 
                                                 
10  Analogous  specifications  to  those  included  in  the  paper  with  recidivism  defined  as  a  subsequent 
adjudication yielded qualitatively similar results.    7 
zip code of residence. With the exception of Youth Crime Rate in Zip, which comes directly from 
DJJ records, these measures are derived from the 1990 Census of Population of Housing.  
 
Constructing the Peer Measures 
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics for measures of peer characteristics; the list of 
peer characteristics parallels the list of individual characteristics (i.e. the demographic, criminal 
history, and neighborhood characteristics). The peer measures are essentially weighted averages 
of a particular characteristic, where the weights are the number of days an individual is exposed 
to each peer.  In constructing these peer measures, however, one must account for the fact that we 
only observe individuals who are released in the two-year period from July 1, 1997 to June 30, 
1999.  Thus, for individuals who are released towards the beginning (end) of the sample period, 
any peers who are released before (after) the sample period begins will not be observed; we 
classify these individuals as pre and post-censoring cases. However, while we cannot identify 
each youth’s exact set of peers, we can calculate an unbiased estimate of their peer exposure 
under  the  assumption  that  the  within-facility  variation  in  peer  characteristics  is  random  with 
respect to when an individual is assigned to the facility. This is the central identifying assumption 
of the paper and we provide direct evidence to support this assumption below.  
In  particular,  we  estimate  each  individual’s  exposure  to  peers  who  would  have  been 
released either before or after the sample period by using the characteristics of the individuals 
observed to be released from the facility during the full sample period. In this way, we form the 
peer  measure used in the analysis by averaging (i) the characteristics of those peers actually 
observed to overlap with the individual and (ii) a properly weighted measure of the estimated 
characteristics of the peers with whom this individual would have overlapped, but who  were 
released outside of the sample period. This ensures that the peer measure used in the analysis is 
an  unbiased  measure  of  the  true  peer  measure  for  each  individual  as  long  as  the  sample  of 
individuals released during the study period is not systematically different than those released just 
before or after it. In this way, while our subsequent peer measure is subject to some measurement 
error, this error is uncorrelated with the individual characteristics included in the regression. We 
describe the exact procedure used to construct the peer measure, dealing with four separate cases 
of censoring, in Appendix 1.  
 
III.  Empirical Methodology and Identification   8 
Empirical Specification  
The primary analysis presented in this paper relates recidivism to vectors of individual 
and peer characteristics.
11  The general specification that we take to the data can be written as:
12 
(1)  ( ) ( ) 0 1 * _ _ * _
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The dependent variable, R
h
ijt indicates whether individual i in facility j, who is released in period 
t, recidivates with offense type h. Peer_offense
h
ijt describes an individual’s exposure to peers with 
a history of offense type h. Offense
h
ijt equals one if individual i has a history of offense type h, 
while No_Offense
h
ijt indicates no prior history of that offense. Pijt is a vector of additional peer 
characteristics including demographic variables as  well as peer  criminal histories in all other 
crime  categories.  Similarly,  Xijt  is  a  vector  of  individual  demographic  and  criminal  history 
variables, including prior histories in all other crime categories. We estimate equation (1) for ten 
crime categories simultaneously using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework.
13 
Following the theoretical motivation laid out in the introduction, we focus our analysis on 
crime-specific peer effects: e.g., does the increased exposure to peers with a history of auto theft 
make an individual more likely to commit auto theft upon release? These crime-specific peer 
effects are captured by the parameters  0 and  1 in equation (1). It is important to emphasize that 
the total number of prior felonies along with controls for the prior histories of peers in each of the 
ten crime categories are included in each regression in the vector Pijt.   
A second important feature of equation (1) is that it allows crime-specific peer effects to 
vary with an individual’s own criminal experience, as reflected in the parameters  0 and  1.  We 
chose this specification at the outset for two main reasons. First, the distinction between peer 
                                                 
11Clearly,  recidivism  is  a  function  of  both  actual  criminal  activity  and  the  probability  of  arrest  and 
adjudication. To the extent that some peer effects take the form of learning to avoid arrest and adjudication, 
our analysis will understate the overall level of increased criminal activity that follows exposure to peers 
with more experience at a given crime. On the other hand, it is possible that exposure to peers in prison 
makes an individual bolder or less cautious when committing crimes upon release; this type of “machismo” 
effect could increase arrest rates even if the underlying level of criminal activity has not changed. 
12 In the context of juvenile correctional facilities, the simultaneity problem (first described by Manski 
(1993)) is that the influence of peer characteristics, such as the intensity of peer criminal history, cannot be 
distinguished from the influence of future peer behavior. Because it is impossible to distinguish these types 
of peer effects without strong a priori functional form assumptions, we simply assume that peer effects 
operate through the influence of peer characteristics rather than subsequent peer behavior.  
13 The standard errors that are reported for this system of regressions that include facility fixed effects are 
not further adjusted for clustering at the facility level. An analysis of the effects of controlling for clustering 
in a series of separate regressions had almost no effect on the estimated standard errors for models that 
included facility fixed effects. In fact, the standard errors on our parameters of interest decreased about as 
often as they increased.   9 
effects that reinforce existing criminal tendencies and those that cause individuals to branch out 
into  new  areas  of  criminal  activity  is  of  first-order  importance  for  (i)  determining  which 
theoretical  explanations  for  the  presence  of  peer  effects  are  consistent  with  the  data  and  (ii) 
policymakers concerned with optimal assignment, as knowledge of the nature of crime-specific 
peer effects helps to determine the best way to group individuals on the basis of prior criminal 
records. Second, the existing literature demonstrates that juvenile offenders show tendencies to 
specialize – i.e., recidivate in a crime category in which they already have a criminal history 
(Wolfgang et. al., 1972; Bursik, 1980; Rojek and Erickson, 1982; Cohen, 1986; Farrington et. al., 
1988). Within our dataset, Table 2 reports OLS estimates of regressions of recidivism in each 
crime category on whether the individuals had any history of each of the ten crimes. The first row 
presents the diagonal coefficients (e.g. the relationship between having a history of auto theft and 
recidivating  with  auto  theft)  while  the  second  row  presents  the  average  of  the  off-diagonal 
coefficients. In every case but felony weapons, experience in a particular crime is a significant 
predictor  of  recidivating  with  that  crime;  in  addition,  the  magnitudes  of  these  specialization 
coefficients are greater than those for all other types of criminal experience (as reflected in the 
average of the off-diagonal coefficients). Thus, allowing an individual’s prior criminal experience 
to have both a level and slope effect in equation (1) permits the estimated peer effects to take a 
flexible form with respect to the baseline propensity to recidivate in a crime category.
14   
  A  third  important  feature  of  our  main  specification,  and  the  main  innovation  of  our 
analysis vis a vis the existing literature, is the inclusion of facility-by-prior offense fixed effects. 
As written,  j applies to all individuals in the facility, while µj is an additional facility fixed effect 
that applies to individuals with a history of offense type h, Offense
h
ijt. The inclusion of these fixed 
effects  controls  for:  (i)  the  non-random  assignment  of  individuals  to  facilities  and  (ii)  any 
unobserved differences correlated across all individuals in a facility. In both cases, separate fixed 
effects are estimated for those with and without a prior history in a given crime category. This 
ensures that the impact of peers on recidivism is identified using only within-facility variation in 
peer exposure.
15 In order for this methodology to yield consistent estimates of causal peer effects, 
                                                 
14 It is important to note that both individual and peer criminal history measures are based on whether an 
individual has any history of the particular offense rather than whether it is the most recent offense. The 
results of additional regressions (not included in the paper) that include distinct variables characterizing an 
individual’s past versus most recent crimes indicate that prior offenses have a remarkably similar impact on 
recidivism no matter when they occurred.  This may reflect the short criminal histories of juveniles, which 
typically impy that even the most distant crimes have occurred in the not so distant past. 
15 A natural concern that arises when including facility fixed effects is whether there is sufficient variation 
in the peer measures within facilities to identify peer effects precisely. Table 1 reports both overall and 
within-facility standard deviations for each peer measure, showing that a substantial amount of variation in 
peer measures remains when the variation is restricted to within-facility.    10 
the timing of the assignment of individuals to facilities with respect to the particular peers in the 
facility at that time must be as good as random within the two-year sample period.
16  
  Therefore, an important concern, which could invalidate this identifying assumption, is 
the possibility of trends in criminal activity. If, for example, there is a general upward trend in 
felony drug crimes over the course of our sample, then individuals observed later in the sample 
will both (i) likely be exposed to a higher proportion of peers with a history of felony drug crimes 
and (ii) be more likely to recidivate  with a  felony  drug crime upon release; this  would bias 
estimated peer effects upwards.  To assess the extent to which peer composition (and therefore 
crime itself) has changed over the course of our sample period, we regress peer exposure in each 
of the ten crime categories on quarter of release dummies. Relative to the first quarter, we find 
that there is some evidence of downward trends in crime; this pattern is strongest for property 
crimes. However, just 29 of the 70 estimated coefficients are significant and the magnitudes of 
the  coefficients  are  consistently  quite  small,  especially  when  compared  to  the  average  peer 
measure; the average coefficient on the quarter of release dummies is just -.009. 
To account for these slight trends in crime, we include quarter of release dummies  t    in 
our baseline specification - equation (1), although it is worth noting that these have a negligible 
effect  on  the  estimated  coefficients.  We  also  provide  additional  evidence  below  that  these 
minimal trends in crime are not a significant concern. In particular, we show that our main results 
are not sensitive to controlling for crime trends in a number of ways, including: month dummies, 
judicial circuit by quarter dummies, and judicial circuit specific monthly time trends. 
 
Diagnostic Tests of Identifying Assumption and Other Threats to Identification 
As mentioned above, our ability to identify causal peer effects rests on the assumption 
that the timing of the assignment of individuals to facilities is as good as random within the two-
year study period. This assumption gives rise to a clear implication that is testable on observable 
characteristics:  within-facility  variation  in  peer  characteristics  should  be  uncorrelated  with 
individual  characteristics.  In  Tables  3a  and  3b,  we  provide  a  test  that  individual  observable 
characteristics are essentially orthogonal to the within-facility variation in peer measures.  In 
                                                 
16 It is important to note that because we do not directly observe whether an individual interacts with all of 
his peers, the peer effect identified in our analysis combines the true impact of each peer interaction within 
the facility with the likelihood (or intensity) with which that interaction occurs. In this way, it is important 
to recognize that the effect captured here is context-specific. While this would be the effect of interest for 
policymakers  concerned  with  optimal  assignment  in  Florida’s  juvenile  facilities,  because  this  effect 
depends in part on the nature of the interactions that occur within Florida’s juvenile correctional facilities, it 
is impossible to ascertain the more structural effect associated with each distinct peer interaction.   
   11 
particular, we construct an index of individual characteristics for each crime category using a 
measure  of  predicted  recidivism  derived  from  a  regression  of  recidivism  on  individual 
characteristics and facility fixed effects; the predicted recidivism measure is the fitted value for 
the individual characteristics in this regression. This measure captures that part of recidivism that 
can be explained by observable attributes related to an individual’s prior criminal history, age, 
sex, race, age at first offense, and residential neighborhood.  
Table 3a reports the results of regressing this predicted recidivism measure on just the 
two peer measures of primary interest for each crime category; i.e. the two interaction terms. 
Table 3b repeats these regressions adding facility-by-prior offense fixed effects. In Table 3a, the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant in almost every instance.  Thus, peer exposure is 
strongly correlated with pre-determined individual attributes that likely affect facility assignment.  
In Table 3b, on the other hand,  where only within-facility variation in peers is used in both 
measures, there is almost no evidence of correlation between peer characteristics and predicted 
recidivism. Almost all of the coefficients decrease in size by one to two orders of magnitude. In 
fact, for individuals without a prior history in the crime category, the coefficients,  1, are never 
significant  and  in  all  cases  are  quite  small.  For  individuals  with  a  prior  history  in  a  crime 
category, only the felony weapons coefficient is significant, although it is still quite small in size.  
In  general,  then,  this  strenuous  test  of  our  central  identifying  assumption  strongly 
supports the conclusions that: (i) there is almost no correlation of the within-facility variation in 
peer measures  with the key pre-determined individual attributes related to recidivism in each 
crime category and (ii) any analysis of peer effects that incorporates across-facility variation is 
likely to lead to sizeable biases in the estimated effects.
  
A  separate  issue  related  to  facility  assignment  that  might  invalidate  our  identifying 
assumption is the concern that youths who have committed crimes together might be assigned to 
the same facility.  If, for example, individuals who belong to the same gang have similar criminal 
histories  and  are  sentenced  to  the  same  facility  at  similar  times,  we  might  estimate  positive 
interactions between peer and individual criminal history variables in our recidivism regressions 
even  in  the  absence  of  peer  effects  in  correctional  facilities.  With  regards  to  this  potential 
concern, it is important to first point out that the lack of any systematic within-facility correlation 
between individual and peer characteristics described above already implies that there is not any 
undo  clustering  in  the  timing  of  assignment  to  correctional  facilities  for  individuals  with 
particular  criminal  histories.  However,  we  further  address  this  potential  issue  by  examining 
clustering in the assignment of individuals to facilities on the basis of residential zip code. As a 
starting point, it is important to note that individuals are not generally exposed to many peers   12 
from the same zip code. In particular, of the 189 individuals released, on average, from a facility, 
an  individual  is  exposed  to  only  six  individuals  with  the  same  residential  zip  code.  Thus, 
individuals from the same zip code generally contribute only about two to three percent of the 
characteristics used in calculating an individual’s peer measures.  
Table  4  tests  whether  there  is  any  undue  clustering  of  release  or  admit  dates  for 
individuals from the same zip code.  To test whether individuals from the same zip code are 
disproportionately released or admitted closer to one another in time, we examine the difference 
between the proportion released (admitted) from the same zip code in a specified time period and 
the proportion released (admitted) from the same zip code in the overall sample. We consider 
individuals released within 7, 14, and 21 days of each other. Of the individuals released within 
seven  days  of  one  another,  2.8  percent  share  the  same  zip  code,  while  2.7  percent  of  all 
individuals released from the same facility share the same zip code. Similarly, 2.9 percent of 
those admitted within seven days of one another share the same zip code compared to 2.8 percent 
of those admitted during the first year of our sample period.
17 These differences, as well as those 
for the 14- and 21-day time periods, are not significant at the 5 percent level. More importantly, 
even if these differences were statistically significant, the magnitudes, which are only between 
0.2 and 0.3 percent, would contribute so little to the variation in our peer measures that such 
neighborhood clustering cannot possibility explain even a small fraction of our results. 
 
IV.  Results 
Main Results 
Table 5 reports the coefficients  0 and  1 for a specification of the type shown in equation 
(1) for each crime category. The full specification is reported in Appendix Table 2 and includes 
facility-by-prior  offense  fixed  effects  as  well  as  additional  controls  for  peer  and  individual 
characteristics  characterizing  criminal  history  in  each  crime  category,  total  number  of  past 
felonies, age at first offense, current age, sex, and characteristics of the residential zip code.
 18 
The first row of Table 5 reports  0, the estimated crime-specific peer effect for those with 
a history of having committed the relevant offense and the second row reports  1, the estimated 
                                                 
17 We restrict the sample to this period because we observe most of the individuals admitted during this 
period, missing only those serving particularly long sentences. In general, because our sample is based on 
all individuals released during a two-year period, we are not able to characterize all of the individuals 
admitted during any particular period. 
18 While we look for evidence of peer effects in particular crime categories (such as grand larceny), it is 
certainly possible that individuals specialize in groups of particular crime categories (such as all thefts) 
rather than in just one particular crime category. Appendix Table 2 generally reveals broad specialization 
across drug crimes as well all forms of theft.   13 
peer effect for individuals without a history of having committed this offense. The estimates of 
 1 are negative as often as positive, with no statistically significant evidence of positive peer 
effects in any crime category.  In addition, the hypothesis that  1  equals zero in each category 
cannot be rejected; the p-value of the joint test is 0.3694. In contrast, the parameter estimates 
for  0 are positive in almost every case and statistically significant for burglary, petty larceny, 
felony  and  misdemeanor  drug  crimes,  aggravated  assault,  and  felony  sex  offenses.
19  Thus, 
exposure to a greater percentage of peers with a history of having committed burglaries increases 
the likelihood that an individual with a prior adjudication for burglary commits another burglary 
upon release; no such effect exists for those without a prior history of burglary.  
As  shown  in  Table  2  above,  the  history  of  a  prior offense  in  a  category  is  a  strong 
predictor of future recidivism. Thus, in order to get a sense of the magnitudes of the estimated 
reinforcing peer effects, it is helpful to compare them to the mean propensity of an individual 
with  a  prior  offense  to  recidivate  in  that  same  crime  category.  On  average,  for  example,  as 
indicated in Table 2, individuals with a prior history of burglary recidivate with a burglary 13.6 
percent of the time. Thus, the estimated reinforcing peer effect of 0.19 for burglary implies that a 
standard deviation increase in exposure to peers that have committed burglaries (0.16) increases 
the likelihood of recidivism from 13.6 to 16.6 percent for these individuals at the mean. Similarly, 
the estimated reinforcing peer effect for felony drug crimes of 0.31 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in exposure to peers with a history of a felony drug crime (0.10) increases the 
likelihood of recidivating with a felony drug crime at the mean from 28.5 to 31.6 percent. In this 
way, the estimated magnitudes of these peer effects are sizeable, but also appear to be reasonable 
given the relatively high baseline propensities of individuals to recidivate in a crime category in 
which they have prior experience.
20 
While the nature of our analysis limits our ability to distinguish specific mechanisms 
through which peer effects operate, the general pattern of results presented in Table 5 does fit 
better  with  some  mechanisms.    One  explanation  that  fits  well  with  the  existence  of  strong 
reinforcing peer effects and limited effects on those without prior experience in a crime category 
                                                 
19 Additional specifications, not included in the paper, show that the strong evidence of peer effects for 
felony drug crimes is primarily driven by felony non-marijuana drug crimes.  
20 The magnitudes of the peer effects estimated here are also reasonable when compared to other setting 
where peers are randomly assigned. In a study of the effect of college roommate drinking on GPA, for 
example, Kremer and Levy (2003) find evidence of a large reinforcing peer effect. Specifically, they find 
that, on average, males assigned to roommates who reported drinking prior to entering college had a one-
quarter point lower GPA than those assigned non-drinking roommates. This effect is four times as large, a 
full point GPA, for males who themselves had a history of frequent drinking prior to college. Sacerdote 
(2001) also reports evidence that the interaction between own and roommate background characteristics has 
a strong influence on an individual’s own freshman year GPA in college.
   14 
(particularly for misdemeanor drug crimes) is that peers reinforce addictive behavior. Another 
explanation  that  fits  well  with  economic  theory  is  that  individuals  may  experience  different 
returns from participation in different types of crimes related to natural abilities, opportunities, 
human capital accumulation, involvement in crime networks, or other factors (as in the legitimate 
sector of the economy). In this case, individuals with a history in a crime category have already 
revealed themselves to have high returns and, likely, substantial human capital in this category. 
Consequently, access to peers that increase the individual’s returns to this type of crime through, 
for example, social learning, may lead to increased activity in this category.
21 Conversely, access 
to peers that increase returns in another category may be much less valuable, as this may not raise 
the returns in that category enough to change the individual’s optimal behavior.
22 
  
Robustness and Heterogeneity of Main Results 
As discussed previously, one concern is that our findings are driven by trends in criminal 
activity. We therefore controlled for quarter of release in our main specification, as presented in 
Table 5. To further assess the validity of this concern, we first test the joint significance of the 
quarter of release dummies in each crime category presented in Table 5 and present the resulting 
p-values.  They are jointly significant at the five percent level only for auto theft and at the ten 
percent level for petty larceny. Thus, not only is there a low correlation between quarter of release 
and our peer measures, quarter of release also predicts little of recidivism.  Table 6 further shows 
the robustness of our results across crime categories to time trends and presents the results of 
estimating equation (1) with (i) no controls for time, (ii) quarter of release dummies (i.e. our 
baseline specification), and (iii) interactions between dummies for the 20 judicial circuits and 
each  quarter  of  release.  The  point  estimates  are  remarkably  similar  across  each  of  these 
specifications and evidence of a reinforcing peer effect is consistently seen for burglary, felony 
drugs,  misdemeanor  drugs,  aggravated  assault,  and  felony  sex  offenses;  the  reinforcing  peer 
effect for petty larceny loses its significance  when quarter by judicial circuit interactions are 
included, but is still very close in magnitude. 
  To simplify the comparison of our main results presented in Table 5 with alternative 
specifications (like those in Table 6), the rest of our analysis estimates equation (1) under the 
constraints that (i) the reinforcing peer effects are equal across crime categories and (ii) the non-
                                                 
21 A small but growing body of research in economics on social learning and network formation includes 
Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (1999), and Conley and Udry (2002).  
22 Put another way, it is important to distinguish between learning from one’s peers and how that learning 
translates into subsequent criminal activity. The results suggest that learning in a category in which the 
youth already has experience may be more valuable and therefore more likely to be translated into action.    15 
reinforcing peer effects are equal across crime categories. This yields just two coefficients of 
interest from each specification rather than twenty. Row (1) of Table 7 displays the results of 
estimating our baseline specification, presented in  Table 5, in this  way.  This yields a highly 
significant reinforcing peer coefficient of 0.111 and insignificant non-reinforcing peer coefficient 
of 0.006. These coefficients are virtually identical when controlling for quarter by judicial circuit 
interactions, month of release dummies, and judicial circuit specific time trends, as seen in rows 
(2) – (4) of Table 7. 
Row  (5)  of  Table  7  presents  the  constrained  coefficients  that  result  when  estimating 
equation  (1)  without  individual  characteristics.  The  estimated  reinforcing  and  non-reinforcing 
peer effects are virtually identical to our baseline results (0.114 and 0.007). This result is further 
evidence in support of our identifying assumption since the inclusion of individual characteristics 
should have no effect on the estimated peer effects if they are uncorrelated with peer measures.  
Although  each  regression  presented  thus  far  includes  separate  fixed  effects  for 
individuals with and without a history of having committed that crime, it is important to note that 
an  individual’s  own  history  of  committing  an  offense  is  interacted  with  only  a  single  peer 
measure – the propensity of peers to have previously committed crimes in that category. This 
naturally  leads  to  the  question  of  whether  the  evidence  of  reinforcing  peer  effects  would  be 
eliminated if an individual’s own offense history was fully interacted with the complete set of 
peer  offense  characteristics.  To  explore  this  possibility,  we  estimated  the  following  fully 
interacted specification. 
(2) 
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Row  (6)  of  Table  7  presents  the  results  from  estimating  equation  (2)  when  0     and  1     are 
constrained to be constant across crime categories; the estimates are 0.117 and 0.006 respectively. 
These are virtually identical to our baseline specification. In addition, most of the coefficients on 
the off-diagonal interactions,   and   , are not significant. Tests of the joint significance of these 
off-diagonal  terms  for  each  crime  category  indicate  that  (i)  none  of  the  non-reinforcing  off-
diagonal coefficients,   , are jointly significant and (ii) the reinforcing off-diagonal terms,   , 
are jointly significant at the ten percent level for only burglary, aggravated assault, and felony sex 
offenses. In addition, none of the off-diagonal coefficients are consistently significant across the 
ten crime categories. For instance, exposure to peers with a history of felony drug offenses or sex 
offenses does not increase the recidivism of all individuals, just those individuals with histories of   16 
these offenses themselves. Thus, the reinforcing peer effect reported in our main specification is 
driven by crime-specific peer exposure. 
To  test  the  robustness  of  our  measures  of  peer  exposure  to  the  measurement  error 
associated with the censoring of the sample, we estimate equation (1) using only those individuals 
who are released during the middle two-thirds of our sample, October 31, 1997 through February 
28, 1999. Because the average sentence length for the sample is less than six months, only a small 
portion of the peer exposure measure  must be estimated for these individuals. The estimated 
constrained coefficients are presented in row (7) of Table 8 and are equal to 0.176 ( 0   ) and 0.014 
( 1   ). The magnitudes of these effects are somewhat greater than those reported in our baseline 
specification,  which  is  consistent  with  the  notion that  the  measurement  error  induced  by  the 
portion of the peer measure that needs to be estimated for some individuals due to censoring has 
an attenuating effect on the estimated peer effects. 
Finally, we assess whether the estimated peer effects are heterogeneous across facility 
characteristics, beginning with facility size. As discussed above, the peer effect identified in our 
analysis combines the true impact of each peer interaction within the facility with the likelihood 
(or intensity) with which that interaction occurs. Thus, the estimated peer effect might differ by 
facility size for two reasons: (i) the true peer effect is different in small facilities or (ii) peers 
interact differently within large versus small facilities.
23 Row (8) of Table 7 presents the results of 
estimating the constrained version of equation (1) for the sample of 3,998 individuals in the 115 
smallest facilities, i.e. those facilities with an average of 20 or fewer individuals concurrently 
serving sentences. The estimated reinforcing and non-reinforcing peer effects are equal to 0.134 
and -0.002, which are again quite comparable to the results for the whole sample.  
While we do not have enough data to examine peer effects separately for each type of 
programming  used  in  the  state  (e.g.,  group  homes,  boot  camps),  we  can  estimate  the  model 
separately  for  the  6,990  individuals  in  residential  facilities  and  1,226  individuals  in  non-
residential facilities.  Rows (9) and (10) of Table 7 present the results for residential and non-
residential facilities, respectively. The constrained reinforcing peer coefficient is equal to 0.100 in 
residential facilities, which is very similar to that seen for the entire sample. For non-residential 
facilities, this coefficient is equal to 0.171. Thus, reinforcing peer effects appear to be even larger 
                                                 
23 Also note, it is generally not possible to sign the bias that would result if true peer groups consisted of a 
smaller subset of the individuals within a facility. Manski (1993) points out that it is impossible to identify 
the true reference group without some a priori knowledge of the way that individuals interact within a 
larger group; see Section 2.5 in particular. In general, depending on how peer characteristics are defined in 
the analysis and how individuals actually interact, the mis-specification of the proper reference group can 
bias the results in any direction.     17 
in  non-residential  facilities.  The  constrained  specification,  however,  masks  the  fact  that  this 
reinforcing peer effect is being driven by large coefficients for the crimes of auto theft, robbery, 
felony drug offenses, and aggravated assault.  A potential explanation for these effects is that the 
crimes  of  auto  theft  and  felony  drugs  are  largely  dependent  on  access  to  networks.
24  Non-
residential facilities may inadvertently increase the formation and expansion of criminal networks 
by  bringing  together  young  offenders  from  surrounding  neighborhoods.
25    This  points  to  an 
obviously difficult issue for policymakers in how best to deal with first-time and other young 
juvenile offenders, as the evidence presented here implies that grouping them together in non-
residential facilities may lead to the rapid expansion of criminal networks.
26 
 
V.  Conclusion  
    This  paper  analyzes  the  influence  that  juvenile  offenders  serving  time  in  the  same 
correctional  facility  have  on  each  other’s  subsequent  criminal  behavior.  The  results  provide 
strong evidence of the existence of peer effects in juvenile correctional facilities. In almost all 
instances, these peer effects have a reinforcing nature, whereby exposure to peers with a history 
of committing a particular crime increases the probability that an individual who has already 
committed the same type of crime recidivates with that crime. In our main analysis, this form of a 
reinforcing peer effect is positive and significant for the cases of burglary, petty larceny, felony 
drug  offenses,  misdemeanor  drug  offenses,  aggravated  assault,  and  felony  sex  offenses.  In 
contrast,  we  find  no  evidence  that  exposure  to  peers  with  particular  criminal  histories 
significantly increases an individual’s propensity to recidivate in a crime category in which the 
individual has no prior experience. In addition, there are large reinforcing peer effects for the 
crimes  of  auto  theft  and  felony  drug  offenses  in  non-residential  facilities;  we,  therefore, 
conjecture that the grouping of juveniles from nearby neighborhoods may inadvertently foster the 
formation and expansion of criminal networks.  
    A number of mechanisms are particularly capable of explaining the most robust feature 
of  our  findings:  that  peer  effects  tend  to  reinforce  existing  criminal  behavior.  One  such 
                                                 
24 Ayres and Levitt (1998) describe the types of networks that exist in auto theft rings. Stolen cars must be 
transferred from the individual who steals the car to a chop-shop or another appropriate sales outlet. As in 
other forms of organized crime, such a transaction may require a level of confidence that the individual will 
not reveal the network if arrested.  
25 Individuals in the lowest risk category are typically assigned to non-residential facilities close to their 
homes (94 percent are in the same county of residence), while all others are assigned to residential facilities 
typically much further from home (only 27 percent are in the county of residence). 
26  Previous  specifications  also  considered  the  role  played  by  sentence  length  in  more  detail  and,  in 
particular, controlled for the number of days served by peers. The coefficient on this variable (both when 
other peer measures were included and excluded) varied in sign and was never significant.   18 
explanation  is  that  peers  reinforce  addictive  behavior,  which  may  explain  part  of  the  large 
reinforcing peer effect for misdemeanor drug crimes. Another important explanation is that the 
matching of peers with common histories may lead to the creation and expansion of criminal 
networks, which are important for crimes such as auto theft and felony drug crimes.  A more 
general explanation for reinforcing peer effects that we advance in the paper is that peers may 
increase knowledge about specific crimes, thereby increasing returns to committing those crimes.  
While one might initially expect this to lead to increased criminal activity by all individuals, the 
importance of specialization in criminal activity suggests that increased returns to  a criminal 
activity are likely to lead to the largest increase in criminal activity in a crime category in which 
an individual has already specialized, thereby leading to the existence of reinforcing peer effects.  
The  results  of  our  analysis  have  several  policy  implications.  First,  while  a  policy  of 
grouping  offenders  with  others  who  have  committed  the  same  crimes  may  seem  prudent  to 
prevent the exposure of young offenders to peers with experience in other criminal activities, 
such a policy may inadvertently increase exposure to peers with experience precisely in those 
crime categories where it is likely to be of greatest use. Second, and more broadly speaking, the 
existence of peer effects in juvenile criminal behavior suggests that any reduction in crime leads, 
through reductions in the criminal histories of peers, to future reductions in crime. It is important 
to account for these dynamic benefits when considering the overall benefits of reducing crime. 
Our analysis suggests caution in pursuing strategies that incarcerate more juveniles, as the intense 
exposure of juvenile offenders to one another in correctional facilities may increase the amount of 
criminal behavior upon release.
27  However, our analysis also suggests that other programs that 
reduce juvenile crime might have dynamic benefits that greatly enhance the short-term benefits 
derived from the decreased criminal behavior of program participants, so long as they do not 
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Appendix 1 
This appendix describes the exact procedure we use to calculate the peer characteristics 
used in the analysis. More specifically,  when  calculating an individual i’s peer exposure,  we 
allow each observed potential peer, j, in the facility to contribute to this measure in two ways—
directly and indirectly. A potential peer contributes directly to the peer measure if his sentence 
actually  overlaps  with  individual  i’s  sentence,  in  which  case,  we  weight  the  relevant  peer 
characteristic, cj, by the number of days that individual i is exposed to the j
th peer, dij. A potential 
peer  also  contributes  indirectly  to  the  peer  measure  in  certain  circumstances,  leading  to  an 
additional weight, wij, on the relevant peer characteristic. This weight is based on the fraction of 
sentences of the length served by the potential peer j that would not have been observed for those 
peers who overlap with the individual. In this way, peer exposure to characteristic cj is calculated 
by the following equation 
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Exp                          (A1) 
 
We estimate wij by calculating the expected number of days that individual i is exposed to 
an individual with a sentence the length of individual j’s who would have been released either 
before or after the sample period. In doing so, we make the assumption that each facility is in a 
steady state with respect to the peers served over the relevant period and that the release date of 
each individual is randomly distributed across the sample period. The calculation of wij is best 
understood by considering an example. Consider individual i released 30 days after the sample 
period begins, having served a sentence of 150 days. Additionally, consider a peer, j, in the same 
facility with a sentence of 50 days. This information is depicted in the following diagram, where 
the  horizontal  axis  represents  time,  t,  and  the  vertical  axis  represents  the  number  of  days 
individual i would be exposed to peer j if peer j is released at date t. 
 
Scenario 1:   date_release[i] <= days_in[i] - days_in[j] 
Example:  date_release[i] = 30; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 50 
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Any individuals who are released before t = 0 will be unobserved in the sample. To calculate the 
average number of days that individual i is expected to have been exposed to individual j, we 
simply divide the area of the shaded region by 729 (the number of days in the observed sample). 
To see this more clearly, imagine, for example, that one individual with a 50-day sentence is 
released during the sample period. In this case, the probability that such an individual was also 
released  in  the  120  days  before  the  sample  period  is  120/729  and  the  average  exposure  of 
individual i to this individual is simply the average height of the shaded region. Thus, the correct 
weight for individual j, wij, is simply the area of the shaded region (length * average height) 
divided by 729.  
This example depicts the correction made for just one case of pre-censoring. For peers 
with very long sentences, pre-censoring can occur such that the unobserved region is just the 
shaded triangular portion of the diagram above. Similarly, there are two cases of post-censoring 
that parallel those of pre-censoring. The following are examples and diagrams that depict the 
three additional censoring scenarios. In each scenario, wij is set equal to the area of the shaded 
region divided by 729.  
 
Scenario 2:   days_in[i] - days_in[j] < date_release[i] <= days_in[i] 




Scenario 3:   days_in[j] >= 729 - date_release[i] + days_in[i] 
Example:  date_release[i] = 700; days_in[i] = 50; days_in[j] = 100 
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Scenario 4:   729 - date_release[i] <= days_in[j] <= 729 - date_release[i] + days_in[i] 
Example:  date_release[i] = 700; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 50     24 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions  
Standard 
Deviation 
Variable  N  Mean  Overall  Within  Definition 
Recidivism           
Recidivism  8216  .67  .47  .45  1 if client recidivated within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Drug  8216  .093  .29  .28  1 if client committed felony drug offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Misd. Drug  8216  .090  .29  .28  1 if client committed misd. drug offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Weapon  8216  .027  .16  .16  1 if client committed felony weapon offense within one year of release, 0 
otherwise 
R_Agg. Assault   8216  .099  .30  .29  1 if client committed aggravated assault within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Sex  8216  .013  .11  .11  1 if client committed felony sex offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Auto Theft  8216  .093  .29  .28  1 if client committed auto theft offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Burglary  8216  .14  .34  .33  1 if client committed burglary offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Grand Larceny  8216  .094  .29  .29  1 if client committed grand larceny offense within one year of release, 0 
otherwise 
R_Petty Larceny  8216  .12  .32  .32  1 if client committed petty larceny offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Robbery  8216  .045  .21  .20  1 if client committed robbery offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
           
Facility Characteristics 
         
# Individuals in Facility per day  14421  48.7  73.5  0  Calculated as number of individuals released multiplied by avg. sentence length 
in the facility, divided by 729 (total number of sample days) 
# Released  14421  196.5  240.5  0  # of individuals released from each facility 
Min Risk  14421  .15  .36  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated minimum risk, 0 otherwise 
Low Risk  14421  .17  .38  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated low risk, 0 otherwise 
Mod Risk  14421  .49  .50  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated moderate risk, 0 otherwise 
High Risk  14421  .17  .38  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated high risk, 0 otherwise 
Max Risk  14421  .010  .099  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated maximum risk, 0 otherwise 
Nonprofit Mgt  14421  .54  .50  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is managed by a private nonprofit 
organization, 0 otherwise 
For-profit Mgt  14421  .15  .36  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is managed by a private for-profit 
organization, 0 otherwise 
County Mgt  14421  .091  .29  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is publicly managed by the county, 0 
otherwise 
State Mgt  14421  .22  .41  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is publicly managed by the state, 0 
otherwise 
           
Individual Characteristics 
         
Female  8216  .14  .35  .19  1 if client is female, 0 otherwise 
Black  8216  .48  .50  .48  1 if client is black, 0 otherwise 
Age First Offense  8216  12.7  2.0  1.8  Client’s age in years at first adjudicated criminal offense 
Age Exit  8216  15.7  1.0  .87  Client’s age in years at exit from facility 
Days In  8216  168.5  106.4  64.0  Number of days an individual is in facility 
           
Individual Criminal History Characteristics 
     
Felonies  8216  4.7  4.6  4.1  Number of felony charges on client’s record 
Fel Drug  8216  .13  .33  .32  1 if any felony drug charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Drug  8216  .16  .37  .36  1 if any misd. drug charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Fel Sex  8216  .067  .25  .24  1 if any felony sex offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Sex  8216  .0095  .097  .096  1 if any misd. sex offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Fel_wpn  8216  .095  .29  .29  1 if any felony weapon offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Agg_Ass  8216  .29  .45  .44  1 if any aggravated assault offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Weap  8216  .042  .20  .20  1 if any misd. weapon offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Auto Theft  8216  .26  .44  .16  1 if any auto theft charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Grlrcn  8216  .35  .48  .46  1 if any grand larceny charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Plrcn  8216  .61  .49  .48  1 if any petty larceny charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Burglary  8216  .58  .49  .47  1 if any burglary charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Robbery  8216  .13  .33  .32  1 if any robbery charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Escape  8216  .077  .27  .25  1 if any escape charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Vandalism  8216  .31  .46  .45  1 if any vandalism charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Disorder  8216  .093  .29  .29  1 if any disorderly conduct charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Other  8216  .92  .27  .26  1 if any other charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
           
Individual Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
Youth Crime Rate in Zip   8216  358  260  247  Total number of juvenile referrals in client’s home zip code, FY 2000-01 
% Own Race in Zip   8216  .60  .33  .32  % of inhabitants in client’s home zip code of same racial group as client, 1990 
Per-Cap Inc Race   8216  10710  4331  4180  Median per-capita income of client’s racial group in client’s home zip code, 1990 
Unemployment Rate   8216  .068  .028  .027  % unemployment rate in client’s home zip code, 1990 
Incarcerated in Zip   8216  109  307  301  Number of people incarcerated in client’s home zip code, 1990   25 
Per-Cap Income   8216  12316  3661  3533  Median per-capita income in home zip code, 1990 
           
Peer Demographic Characteristics     
 
Peer_male  8216  .86  .29  .038  Weighted average of whether or not an individual’s peers are male 
Peer_age_exit  8216  16.4  .88  .22  Weighted average of the age at exit of an individual’s peers  
Peer_age1st  8216  13.1  .81  .32  Weighted average of the age at first offense of an individual’s peers  
           
Peer Criminal History Characteristics   
 
Peer_fel  8216  4.7  2.1  .63  Weighted average of the number of felony charges of an individual’s peers  
Peer_fel_drg  8216  .16  .10  .053  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
drug offenses 
Peer_mis_drg  8216  .19  .11  .065  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. 
drug offenses 
Peer_fel_sex  8216  .069  .097  .038  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
sex offenses 
Peer_mis_sex  8216  .010  .023  .016  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. sex 
offenses 
Peer_felwpn  8216  .092  .070  .046  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any  felony 
weapon offenses 
Peer_aggass  8216  .28  .13  .070  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any  
aggravated assault offenses 
Peer_mis_wpn  8216  .042  .038  .028  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. 
weapon offenses 
Peer_auto  8216  .27  .14  .066  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of auto theft 
Peer_glrcn  8216  .35  .13  .077  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of grand larceny 
Peer_plrcn  8216  .61  .12  .081  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of petty larceny 
Peer_burg  8216  .57  .16  .079  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of burglary 
Peer_rob  8216  .13  .11  .051  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of robbery 
Peer_vand  8216  .30  .11  .070  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of vandalism 
Peer_dsord  8216  .090  .069  .048  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of disorderly 
conduct 
Peer_escp  8216  .077  .093  .039  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of escape 
Peer_other  8216  .92  .074  .048  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of other 
offenses 
           
Peer Neighborhood Characteristics     
 
Peer_percapi  8216  10754  1988  810  Weighted average of the per-capita income in an individual’s peers’ zip codes 
Peer_percorin  8216  93  65  42  Weighted average of the number of incarcerated people in an individual’s peers’ 
zip codes 
    NOTE.—Neighborhood characteristics are constructed for Florida zip codes only.  Individuals with zip codes from other states are assigned a zero for all 
neighborhood characteristics, and a dummy variable denoting that an individual has an out-of-state zip code of residence is included in all regressions.  This 
allows us to maintain the full sample for the regressions, and it controls for the potential problem that out-of-state youths are less likely to recidivate in 
Florida. 
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Table 2.  Specialization in Crime                     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
 
R_Auto 















Offense  0.096**  0.093**  0.055**  0.047**  0.065**  0.256**  0.125**  0.014  0.112**  0.050** 
  (9.78)  (10.73)  (6.54)  (6.57)  (5.74)  (15.60)  (11.05)  (1.40)  (7.25)  (5.93) 
Average of Off-
Diagonal Coefficients  0.013  0.014  0.001  0.002  0.014  0.015  0.012  0.008  0.025  0.000 
Constant  0.029**  0.043**  0.041**  0.072**  0.008  0.029**  0.042**  0.013**  0.074**  0.008** 
  (4.68)  (5.83)  (6.43)  (9.62)  (1.50)  (3.66)  (6.40)  (3.12)  (5.84)  (3.27) 
Observations  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216 
R-squared  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.11  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01 
   NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification which is estimated by OLS, where the dependent variable is recidivism in the crime category at the top of the column.   Offense varies across 
specifications, according to the crime category listed at the top of the column.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft). Each specification also includes 
controls for whether the individual has any history of each of the other nine crime categories; for brevity, only the average of these off-diagonal coefficients is presented in the table.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the facility level. 
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Table 3a.  Regressions of Predicted Recidivism on the Relevant Peer Measure without Facility-by-Prior Offense Fixed Effects 





















Agg. Ass.  
Predicted 
Felony Sex 
.131**  .137**  .041**  .084**  .143**  .522**  .215**  .092**  .176**  .068**  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
13.34  13.27  4.92  10.71  10.94  23.34  14.16  11.24  12.86  3.82 
-.055**  .022**  -.016*  -.028**  .022*  -.039**  -.038**  .031**  -.022*  -.008**  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
5.49  2.06  1.88  3.63  1.93  2.22  3.18  5.65  1.71  2.13 
Facility-by-Prior Offense Fixed 
Effects  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
# observations  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216 
R
2  .3427  .3236  .2227  .1263  .1550  .3522  .3060  .0387  .2043  .2450 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) 
while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics and are based standard errors that are clustered at the facility 
level.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.   The dependent variable is predicted recidivism of the crime labeled at the top of each column. The predicted value for 
each crime category is calculated from a regression of recidivism with the particular crime category on the entire set of observable individual characteristics and facility fixed effects.  This predicted value is then 
regressed with OLS on just the variables presented in these tables.  
 
Table 3b.  Regressions of Predicted Recidivism on the Relevant Peer Measure with Facility-by-Prior Offense Fixed Effects 





















Agg. Ass.  
Predicted 
Felony Sex 
-.000045  -.0011  -.0015  .00089  .0036  .0021  .0020  .0077*  -.00026  .00078  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
0.01  0.31  0.44  0.42  0.78  0.23  0.42  1.83  0.06  0.27 
.0018  .0051  -.0030  -.0018  .00061  -.00027  .00021  .00041  .0011  .00084  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
0.92  1.21  1.19  0.67  0.32  0.08  0.09  0.29  0.36  1.28 
Facility-by-Prior Offense Fixed 
Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
# observations  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216 
R
2  .5552  .5486  .4262  .3812  .4353  .5751  .5844  .3055  .4130  .8432 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) 
while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents 
significance at 10% level.   The dependent variable is predicted recidivism of the crime labeled at the top of each column. The predicted value for each crime category is calculated from a regression of 
recidivism with the particular crime category on the entire set of observable individual characteristics and facility fixed effects.  This predicted value is then regressed on just the variables presented in these 
tables; all specifications are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).     28 
Table 4.  Test for Clustering of Individuals by Five Digit Zip Codes 
    Release Date    Admit Date 














8,216  0.0273   
 
4,148  0.0278   
Within 7 days     7,185  0.0284  0.0022 
  3,553  0.0292  0.0027 
        1.34        1.22 
Within 14 days    7,808  0.0290  0.0026 
  3,938  0.0291  0.0022 
        1.91        1.36 
Within 21 days    8,102  0.0290  0.0022 
  4,096  0.0297  0.0023 
        1.86        1.80 
                 
    NOTE.— The value in each ‘Mean in 5-digit zip’ cell represents the proportion of individuals who have a peer released (admitted) from the same facility that is from the same zip code during the specified time 
period.   Note that the mean for the overall sample period is calculated using the sample of individuals who have at least one peer released (admitted)  within 7, 14, and 21 days, respectively. The absolute value of 
the t-statistic corresponding to each difference is presented in italics.   29 
Table 5.  Main Results: Crime-Specific Peer Effects in Florida Juvenile Correctional Facilities 
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 















-.029  .19**  -.027  .098*  .079  .31*  .25**  -.12  .26*  .34**  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
0.31  2.93  0.38  1.67  0.69  1.90  2.29  0.78  1.78  2.30 
.032  -.022  -.00044  -.11  -.084*  .075  -.045  .049  .090  .043  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
0.56  0.29  0.01  1.52  1.70  1.18  0.82  0.88  0.91  1.27 
% recidivate with offense  9.3%  13.6%  9.4%  11.6%  4.5%  9.3%  9.0%  2.7%  9.9%  1.3% 
# observations  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216 
R
2  .0970  .0943  .0712  .0536  .0942  .1965  .1002  .0468  .0724  .0722 
P-value on test of joint 
significance of quarter 
dummies 
.0328  .1075  .1557  .0575  .7902  .7817  .1463  .7371  .3827  .1096 
H0:  0
auto = … =  0
sex = 0  p = 0.0008                   
H0:  1
auto = … =  1
sex = 0  p = 0.3694                   
    NOTE.— This table presents the results of estimating equation (1) for the ten crime categories simultaneously via a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Offense and Peer_offense vary across columns 
according to the crime category listed at the top of each column.  In the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto 
(exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Each specification controls for: facility-by-prior offense fixed effects, quarter of release dummies, peer demographic and criminal history characteristics, and 
individual demographic and criminal history characteristics. The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  The joint 
hypotheses that the coefficients are equal to zero are evaluated using a Wald test.  
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Table 6. Robustness of Main Results to Time Trends  
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 















Panel1: No Time Controls                     
-.017  .21**  -.038  .10*  .091  .32*  .25**  -.13  .27*  .34**  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
0.18  3.19  0.53  1.75  0.79  1.95  2.23  0.80  1.88  2.30 
.037  -.0084  -.0091  -.11  -.074  .078  -.044  .050  .092  .037  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
0.65  0.12  0.17  1.50  1.52  1.24  0.81  0.90  0.93  1.09 
Panel2: Quarter Dummies (Baseline) 
-.029  .19**  -.027  .098*  .079  .31*  .25**  -.12  .26*  .34**  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
0.31  2.93  0.38  1.67  0.69  1.90  2.29  0.78  1.78  2.30 
.032  -.022  -.00044  -.11  -.084*  .075  -.045  .049  .090  .043  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
0.56  0.29  0.01  1.52  1.70  1.18  0.82  0.88  0.91  1.27 
Panel3: Quarter By Judicial Circuit Interactions 
.045  .20**  -.042  .081  .049  .34**  .24**  -.14  .24*  .30**  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
0.48  3.03  0.58  1.36  0.42  2.08  2.15  0.87  1.68  2.05 
.042  -.033  .019  -.11  -.097  .12*  -.052  .028  .065  .036  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
0.73  0.45  0.34  1.51  1.95*  1.87  0.94  0.49  0.65  1.05 
    NOTE.— Each of the above panels estimates equation (1) for the ten crime categories simultaneously via a seemingly unrelated regression. The results presented in each panel control for facility-by-prior fixed 
effects, peer demographic and criminal history characteristics, and individual demographic and criminal history characteristics.  Controls for time trends differ across panels.  The first panel has no controls for time 
trends, the second panel includes quarter of release dummies, and the third panel includes quarter of release dummies, judicial circuit dummies, and a complete set of interactions between quarter of release and 
judicial circuit. Offense and Peer_offense vary across columns, and correspond to the crime category noted at the top of the column. In the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto 
theft) while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).   The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents 






Table 7.  Robustness and Heterogeneity with Peer Effects Constrained to Be Equal 
Across Crime Categories 







(1)  Baseline Specification (see Table 5)  .111**  .006 
    3.83  0.34 
(2)  Quarter by Judicial Circuit Interactions  .109**  .004 
    3.73  0.22 
(3)  Monthly Dummies  .112**  .006 
    3.85  0.33 
(4)  Judicial Circuit Monthly Time Trends  .105**  .004 
    3.60  0.21 
(5)  Without Individual Characteristics  .114**  .007 
    3.92  0.38 
(6)  Fully Interacted Specification  .117**  .006 
    3.95  0.33 
(7)  Middle Two-Thirds of the Sample  .176**  .014 
    4.61  0.62 
(8)  Small Facilities  .134**  -.002 
    4.14  0.12 
(9)  Residential Facilities  .100**  .005 
    3.12  0.28 
(10)  Non-Residential Facilities  .171**  -.001 
    2.38  0.03 
    NOTE.—  Each row of this table presents the results of a separate specification. A brief description of the specification (i.e. the 
variables included/excluded or the sub-sample used) is presented in the second column. We estimate each specification for all ten 
crime categories using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) but constrain both the estimated reinforcing and non-reinforcing peer 
effects to be equal across crime categories. Thus, rather than 20 coefficients of interest, each of these specifications generate just two 
coefficients of interest and provide a way of summarizing the results presented, for instance, in the first two rows of Table 5.  Unless 
otherwise  indicated,  ach  specification  also  controls  for:  facility-by-prior  offense  fixed  effects,  quarter  of  release  dummies,  peer 
demographic and criminal history characteristics, and individual demographic and criminal history characteristics.   32 
Appendix Table 1.  Examples of Crimes Included in Each Crime Category  
Crime Category  Included Crimes 
Auto Theft  Vehicle theft (2
nd degree); grand theft auto (2
nd degree) 
Burglary  Burglary of a dwelling structure; Possession of burglary tools; Unarmed burglary 
of a dwelling; Burglary of unoccupied dwelling 
Grand Larceny  Grand larceny in the 1
st degree (excluding auto theft); Grand larceny valued 
between $20,000 and $100,000 (excluding auto theft); Grand larceny valued 
between $300 and $20,000 (excluding auto theft); Grand larceny of a firearm; 3
rd 
or subsequent petty larceny conviction 
Petty Larceny  Shoplifting; 1
st or 2
nd petty larceny conviction 
Robbery  Robbery with firearm or weapon; Robbery/carjacking with firearm or weapon; 
Robbery (no firearm or weapon); Robbery and residential home invasion; other 
robbery 
Felony Drug  Possession; Possession with intent to sell; Use; Purchase; Distribution; 
Manufacturing – Includes a variety of drug categories and amounts 
Misdemeanor Drug  Possession or distribution of less than 20 grams marijuana; Possession of narcotic 
equipment; Possession of drug paraphernalia; Possession of legend drugs without 
a prescription 
Aggravated Assault  Aggravated assault and/or battery; Battery on elected or education official; Hit and 
run (failure to remain at scene) ; Aggravated assault with deadly weapon; 
Aggravated assault with intent to commit a felony. 
Felony Weapon  Carry concealed weapon; Possession of weapon on school property; Fire a weapon 
from vehicle; Bomb threat 
Misdemeanor 
Weapon 
Openly carrying prohibited weapon; Improper exhibition of a firearm 
Felony Sex  Sexual assault/battery; Sexual offense against a child; Lewd and lascivious act; 
Other felony sex offenses 
Misdemeanor Sex  Obscene phone call; Indecent exposure in public; prostitution 
Escape  Escape from training school, secure detention, or residential program 
Vandalism  Damage property or criminal mischief  
Disorderly Conduct  Disturbing the peace; Disturbing a school function; Disorderly intoxication; 
Conspire to interrupt education   33 
Appendix Table 2.  Full Set of Table 5 Results: Crime-Specific Peer Effects in Florida Juvenile 
Correctional Facilities 
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 















-.029  .19**  -.027  .098*  .079  .31*  .25**  -.12  .26*  .34**  Offense*Peer_offense ( 0) 
0.31  2.93  0.38  1.67  0.69  1.90  2.29  0.78  1.78  2.30 
.032  -.022  -.00044  -.11  -.084*  .075  -.045  .049  .090  .043  No_Offense*Peer_offense ( 1) 
0.56  0.29  0.01  1.52  1.70  1.18  0.82  0.88  0.91  1.27 
Peer Characteristics                     
  .0067  .045  .051  -.020  .036  .059  -.085**  .16*  -.027  Peer_auto 
  0.11  0.87  0.88  0.55  0.75  1.18  2.24  1.79  1.34 
-.0071    .031  .025  .013  .027  -.0093  .0053  .088  -.00094  Peer_burg 
0.16    0.66  0.48  0.38  0.62  0.21  0.15  1.09  0.05 
-.049  .041    -.021  -.0026  .036  .049  .028  .091  .027  Peer_glrcn 
1.06  0.75    0.40  0.08  0.83  1.09  0.81  1.13  1.46 
.0029  -.090*  -.019    .018  .0089  .011  -.019  .020  .0053  Peer_plrcn 
0.07  1.84  0.44    0.59  0.23  0.26  0.61  0.28  0.32 
.033  -.068  -.12*  -.024    .071  .047  -.040  -.040  -.0098  Peer_rob 
0.52  0.92  1.87  0.33    1.19  0.76  0.85  0.36  0.39 
-.0053  -.086  -.0036  .11  -.043    .036  -.0020  .27**  -.018  Peer_fel_drg 
0.08  1.14  0.06  1.53  0.94    0.57  0.04  2.39  0.69 
-.039  -.095  -.042  -.028  .058  .023    .0027  -.077  .030  Peer_mis_drg 
0.78  1.59  0.82  0.49  1.60  0.49    0.07  0.87  1.52 
-.0045  -.017  .085  .014  -.048  .089  .0045    .27**  .019  Peer_fwpn 
0.06  0.20  1.18  0.18  0.95  1.33  0.06    2.17  0.68 
.050  .021  .0091  .022  .046  -.057  .021  .0097    .036*  Peer_aggass 
1.05  0.37  0.19  0.41  1.34  1.26  0.45  0.27    1.88 
.036  .18*  .070  -.054  .046  -.028  .017  .020  .14    Peer_fel_sex 
0.44  1.87  0.83  0.58  0.78  0.36  0.21  0.32  0.95   
-.070*  .068  -.020  -.015  .0031  .066*  -.014  .017  .055  .0091  Peer_black 
1.74  1.42  0.49  0.32  0.11  1.74  0.36  0.55  0.77  0.57 
.020  .041**  .049**  .020  .018  .0021  .0033  .011  -.019  -.0031  Peer_age_exit 
1.25  2.18  3.01  1.09  1.57  0.14  0.21  0.89  0.69  0.49 
.0056  .00037  -.0058  -.0068  -.013*  -.0028  -.014  .011  .011  .0021  Peer_age1st  
0.51  0.03  0.51  0.54  1.69  0.27  1.30  1.38  0.58  0.47 
-.0000051  .0000055  .0000063  .00000075  .0000037  -.0000075**  -.0000071*  .0000012  .0000031  .0000016  Peer_Percapi 
1.29  1.18  1.57  0.17  1.33  2.03  1.82  0.40  0.44  0.99 
-.000074  .000069  -.000012  .000021  .000057  .000078  .000076  .000047  -.000043  .000018  Peer_Percorin 
0.98  0.77  0.16  0.25  1.06  1.10  1.03  0.83  0.33  0.59 
.0066  -.013*  -.0053  -.00063  -.0015  -.0050  -.0086  .0018  -.010  .00067  Peer_Felonies 
1.01  1.73  0.79  0.09  0.32  0.82  1.35  0.36  0.91  0.26 
Individual Characteristics                     
  .019**  .0028  .0091  .025**  .019**  .021**  .0020  .014  .0016  Auto theft 
  2.02  0.35  1.03  4.48  2.56  2.78  0.34  1.02  0.52 
.014*    .022**  .020**  .0027  .0051  .0038  .0068  -.0040  .0029  Burglary 
1.87    2.90  2.38  0.50  0.71  0.51  1.19  0.30  0.98 
.0024  .019**    .0052  .0044  -.0074  -.0067  -.0047  -.018  -.0016  Grlrcn 
0.32  2.07    0.60  0.82  1.03  0.90  0.83  1.37  0.52 
.011*  .021**  .025**    .0034  -.0025  .0066  -.0047  -.0099  -.00036  Plrcn 
1.63  2.66  3.69    0.70  0.40  0.99  0.92  0.84  0.13 
-.0034  -.010  -.034**  .0013    .022**  .0065  .011  .027  -.0037  Robbery 
0.34  0.85  3.39  0.12    2.33  0.66  1.45  1.56  0.95 
-.022**  -.042**  -.031**  -.032**  .0040    .041**  .0042  -.014  .0018  Fel drug 
2.19  3.48  3.00  2.82  0.55    4.04  0.55  0.81  0.44 
-.0021  -.0070  -.012  -.025**  .0046  .0062    .011*  .017  -.0017  Mis drug 
0.24  0.67  1.29  2.47  0.73  0.74    1.70  1.11  0.50 
-.0090  .028**  .015  .037**  .013*  .0055  .0039    .043**  .0029  Fel_wpn 
0.83  2.20  1.35  3.00  1.68  0.53  0.36    2.24  0.68 
.0027  -.0052  -.0071  .0041  .011**  .00027  .0037  .020**    .00062  AggAss 
0.37  0.60  0.94  0.49  2.03  0.04  0.51  3.62    0.21   34 
.0023  -.020  -.029**  -.0067  -.0043  -.030**  -.029**  -.014  .022    Fel sex 
0.17  1.25  2.12  0.44  0.45  2.35  2.24  1.40  0.92   
.035**  -.0054  -.018**  -.000073  .029**  .085**  .012*  .015**  .080**  .00024  Black 
5.14  0.67  2.56  0.01  5.98  13.17  1.76  2.88  6.68  0.09 
-.017  -.093**  -.031*  -.014  -.018  -.046**  -.052**  -.021*  .029  -.017**  Female 
1.08  4.79  1.88  0.75  1.60  3.00  3.31  1.75  1.03  2.61 
-.014**  -.012**  -.0056  -.017**  -.0039  .011**  .0036  -.0026  -.015**  -.00093  Age Exit  
  3.79  2.77  1.44  3.84  1.45  3.14  0.95  0.92  2.23  0.61 
-.00072  -.0013  -.0021  .0017  -.0026*  -.0062**  -.0049**  -.0019  -.0066**  .00079  Age First Offense 
0.38  0.59  1.11  0.77  1.91  3.47  2.64  1.34  1.99  1.05 
.0017  .0018  .000051  .0016  .0010  -.0012  -.000039  .0011  -.0000054  .00025  Incarcerated in Zip  
1.58  1.37  0.05  1.26  1.28  1.12  0.36  1.30  0.03  0.57 
.00000034  -.00000039  -.00000024  -.0000011  -.0000014**  -.0000008  .00000065  .000000060  -.00000083  -.00000037  Per Capita Income in Zip 
0.56  0.54  0.38  1.51  3.25  1.38  1.08  0.13  0.77  0.15 
.0031**  .0046**  .0022**  .0015  .00020  -.00055  -.00088  .00024  .0043**  .000077  Felonies 
3.36  4.17  2.33  1.41  0.31  0.63  0.96  0.35  2.68  0.21 
# Observations  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216 
R
2  .0970  .0943  .0712  .0536  .0942  .1965  .1002  .0468  .0724  .0722 
    NOTE.— This  table  presents  the  results of  estimating  equation  (1)  for the  ten crime  categories  simultaneously  via  a  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (SUR)  and 
correspond to the main results presented in Table 5.  All specifications include facility-by-prior fixed effects and quarter of release dummies. Offense and Peer_offense 
vary across columns according to the crime category listed at the top of each column.  In the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto 
theft) while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft). The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents 
significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  
 
 